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I. INTRODUCTION
The law enforcement DNA database, known as the Combined DNA
Index System ("CODIS"), has been touted as the best crime-solving
tool since the advent of fingerprints, helping to solve cases that have
been unsolved for decades, and to identify previously convicted offend-
ers who commit new crimes. Recently, however, two United States
Supreme Court opinions have undermined lower court precedent con-
cerning the constitutionality of state law enforcement DNA databases
and shaken the constitutional underpinning of the national DNA
database system. Prior to the Supreme Court's recent pronounce-
ments, state courts had repeatedly rejected challenges to their DNA
Statutes,1 although they did so with little agreement upon legal the-
ory. Then, in its 2000-2001 term, the Supreme Court handed down
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond2 and Ferguson v. City of Charleston.3
These two opinions undermine most, if not all, of the prior cases con-
struing DNA Statutes. In these opinions, the Court clarified its "spe-
cial needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, explaining that a government program violates the
Fourth Amendment if it authorizes suspicionless searches for the "pri-
mary purpose" of evidence-gathering or general crime control.4
In light of this Edmund/Ferguson primary purpose test, lower
courts are facing new challenges to DNA Statutes on the grounds that
the law enforcement DNA databases created by these statutes author-
ize a government program of suspicionless DNA searches as a means
of crime control and criminal investigation-quite probably an illegal
purpose under the Court's primary purpose analysis. Two federal dis-
1. The various state statutes enabling the law enforcement DNA databases will be
referred to throughout this article as the "DNA Statutes" or the 'State DNA Stat-
utes." The federal counterpart, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14,135-14,135e (2002), will be referred to throughout as the
"Federal DNA Act" or the "DNA Act." Although the various state and the federal
statutory provisions differ somewhat, the federal constitutional issues discussed
in this article apply equally to State DNA Statutes and to the Federal DNA Act.
2. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
3. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
4. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43.
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trict courts in California facing challenges to the Federal DNA Act are
at odds: one court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act,5 while
the other court has declared the Federal DNA Act to be unconstitu-
tional, because it violates the Fourth Amendment by authorizing sus-
picionless DNA searches for crime-solving purposes. 6
Part II of this Article explains the operation of CODIS. Part III
examines the Supreme Court's suspicionless search cases. Part IV
analyzes how the Edmund/Ferguson primary purpose analysis has re-
focused the lower courts now facing challenges to CODIS. Part V ex-
plores various possibilities for satisfying the primary purpose analy-
sis, and includes a discussion of recent lower court attempts to
formulate a non-law enforcement primary purpose in order to justify
the DNA database system. Part VI explores the possibility that the
Court will create a new categorical exception to legitimize the DNA
database. This Article concludes that the primary purpose of CODIS
is simply to solve crime-an impermissible primary purpose under
Edmond and Ferguson. The various state and federal statutes that
authorize the suspicionless searches that stock CODIS with DNA
identifiers are, therefore, without constitutional justification.
II. THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM
The DNA Identification Act of 1994,7 enacted as a subsection of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,8 authorized
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish an in-
dex of DNA identification records of persons convicted of crimes.9 The
index would also contain the identification of DNA recovered from
crime scenes, unidentified human remains, and DNA samples volun-
tarily contributed from relatives of missing persons.' 0 This auto-
mated crime-solving system became known as "CODIS," the
Combined DNA Index System.
Created in 1989 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS is
a software program that enables federal, state, and local forensic labo-
ratories to store and compare DNA profiles electronically to solve
crime where there is no suspect, or to identify multiple crimes commit-
ted by the same person. 1 Forensic laboratories that support local po-
5. See infra Part V (discussing United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D.
Cal. 2002)).
6. See infra Part V (discussing United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D.
Cal. 2002)).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14,131-14,134 (2000).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210,304(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2070 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 14,132(a)(1).
10. Id. § 14,132(a)(2)-(a)(4). The statute was amended in 2000 to include DNA sam-
ples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons. See id.
11. Randall S. Murch & Bruce Budowle, Are Developments in Forensic Applications
of DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy Protections?, in 3 GENETIC SECRETS:
2004]
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lice or sheriffs offices may use the software to search their own DNA
databases. Local laboratories can share DNA information by forward-
ing data to the state system. CODIS is typically operated at the state
level by the agency responsible for implementing the state's convicted
offender statutes. The DNA Identification Act provided a statutory
basis for the CODIS system, authorizing a national system operated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and allowing laboratories
throughout the country to compare DNA profiles automatically.12 In
response, states began to enact their own DNA database statutes, and
today all fifty states have DNA statutes establishing state DNA
databases.13 In 1998, the FBI announced its National DNA Index
System ("NDIS"), an electronic system that allows federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies to contribute DNA samples to the na-
tional database.14 As of June 2003, forty-eight states were participat-
ing in NDIS.15
Initially, many states required DNA samples only from offenders
convicted of serious violent felonies such as murder and rape. The
clear trend, however, has been toward rapid expansion of the types of
crimes requiring DNA inclusion in the database.16 Officials in the
State of Virginia, for example, attribute the success of that system to
the inclusion of all felons.1 7 Two states have gone beyond the inclu-
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 212, 221 (Mark
A. Rothstein ed., 1998). CODIS was first implemented as a pilot project in 1990,
serving fourteen state and local laboratories. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CODIS PROGRAM: MISSION STATEMENT AND BACK-
GROUND, at http://www.fbi.govihq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited July 1,
2004) [hereinafter FBI, CODIS PROGRAM: MISSION STATEMENT AND
BACKGROUND].
12. Murch & Budowle, supra note 11, at 212, 221.
13. See Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Ex-
panding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127
(2001).
14. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIRST "COLD" HIT
RECORDED IN NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM!, at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/
pressrel99/coldhit.htm (last visited July 1, 2004). NDIS is the highest level in the
CODIS three-tier hierarchy. See FBI, CODIS PROGRAM: MISSION STATEMENT AND
BACKGROUND, supra note 11. Nationwide, DNA profiles originate at the local
level, then flow to the state and national levels. Id. At the state level, laborato-
ries within states may exchange DNA profiles. Id. State and local agencies oper-
ate their databases according to their state statutory requirement. Id.
15. As of June 2003, only Mississippi and Rhode Island were not connected to NDIS.
See FBI, CODIS PROGRAM: MISSION STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND, supra note 11.
16. See The FBI's CODIS Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Drugs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 107-895 (2002) (testi-
mony of Dwight E. Adams, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfn?id=
252&witid=512 [hereinafter Testimony of Dwight E. Adams].
17. See H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1, at 34 (2000), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2323, 2323 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 106-900]. In a review of Virginia sex
crimes matched with offenders through DNA, 40% of offenders had no prior con-
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sion of only convicted offender DNA. A Louisiana statute authorizes
the collection of DNA from persons merely arrested for certain of-
fenses, to be taken at the time the person is fingerprinted as part of
the booking process.iS A Texas statute authorizes collection of DNA
from persons indicted or arrested for certain felonies and from those
with a previous conviction or deferred adjudication for certain
felonies. 19
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 left one noticeable gap in
CODIS: it did not provide sufficient authority to begin extracting DNA
from those convicted of federal crimes, crimes committed by military
personnel, or crimes committed in Washington, D.C.20 The DNA An-
alysis Backlog Elimination Act of 200021 ("Federal DNA Act") filled
this gap by requiring the addition of samples taken from those con-
victed of certain offenses within the federal, 22 Washington, D.C.,23
and armed forces 24 jurisdictions. When combined with the index of
DNA samples taken from offenders convicted under state statutes,
samples taken from crime scenes and victims of crime, and unidenti-
fied human remains, the result is a comprehensive national law en-
forcement database.
A. How the System Works
CODIS consists of a Forensic Index and an Offender Index. The
Forensic Index contains DNA25 profiles from biological evidence recov-
victions for sexual or violent offenses, inferring that identifications may not have
been made if the database had been confined to violent or sex offenders. Id. In a
Florida study, 52% of offenders linked to a crime through DNA had burglary con-
victions in their criminal histories, thus increasing the size of Florida's DNA
database from 65,000 offenders to over 110,000 in the first year it was imple-
mented. Id.
18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (West Supp. 2004). The Louisiana statute autho-
rizes the collection of DNA from persons arrested for certain violent offenses, in-
cluding murder, assault, stalking and kidnapping. Id. § 15:603.
19. TEX GOv'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (West 2003).
20. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 811(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1312, "authorized the Director of the FBI to
expand CODIS to include Federal crimes, and crimes committed in the District of
Columbia," H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 9 (internal quotations
omitted), the Department of Justice did not believe this provision provided the
FBI with sufficient legal authority to begin collecting samples from federal
offenders.
21. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14,135-14,135e (2002); 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a.
23. Id. § 14,135b.
24. 10 U.S.C. § 1565.
25. DNA scientists James D. Watson and Francis Crick discovered DNA and its heli-
cal structure in 1953. See generally JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX
(1968). The cell is the basic unit of human life, and the human body is made up of
trillions of individual cells. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING 2 (1997) [hereinafter
20041
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ered from crime scenes. The Offender Index contains DNA profiles of
those offenders convicted of qualifying offenses under state or federal
DNA Statutes. The purpose of CODIS is to link crimes together and
to generate investigative leads for law enforcement officials.2 6 For ex-
ample, the suspect DNA from a sexual assault may be profiled and
searched against the Offender Index. A potential match identifies the
perpetrator, and allows qualified DNA laboratory analysts to contact
each other to validate or refute the match. A match allows police in
multiple jurisdictions to coordinate their respective investigations and
to share independently-developed leads. In addition, CODIS matches
DNA profiles within the Forensic Index to link two or more crimes
together, identifying potential serial offenders, and allowing law en-
forcement agencies to pool their information about the cases.
2 7
UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING]. At the center of every cell lies its nucleus.
Within the nucleus are forty-six chromosomes consisting of two sets of twenty-
three chromosomes each, one set inherited from the mother's egg, the other from
the father's sperm. Id. These forty-six chromosomes consist mostly of proteins
and acids, specifically deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Id. DNA is structured in the
shape of the familiar double helix, much like a twisted ladder, but with three
billion rungs. See HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT 23 (1996). The
rungs of the ladder are called "chemical bases" and each base is made up of a
chemical combination. Only four different chemical bases exist in DNA: adenine
(A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G). UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING,
supra, at 1. In addition, A is always paired with T, and G is always connected to
C. Id. It is the order in which these base pairs occur that determines the infor-
mation available. Id.
Less than one percent of DNA varies from person to person, and it is this
comparatively small variation in the order of the DNA chemical bases that makes
each person's DNA unique (except for identical twins). HOWARD COLEMAN & ERIC
SWENSON, DNA IN THE COURTROOM, A TRIAL WATCHER'S GUIDE 32 (1994). This
uniqueness is at the heart of the forensic use of DNA. Id. DNA is present in all
cells, including blood, semen, tissue, bone marrow, hair root, saliva, urine, even
tooth pulp. Id. The DNA in each individual cell is the same throughout the body,
and remains the same throughout a person's lifetime. UNDERSTANDING GENE
TESTING, supra, at 3. Regions of DNA that are not involved in the regulation of
cell activities are called non-coding DNA. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA
TESTS 41 (1990). The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses thirteen standard loci
(locations) in this non-coding region for its law enforcement database. See JOHN
M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR
MARKERS 245 (2001).
26. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DNA
INDEX SYSTEM, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited July
1, 2004) [hereinafter FBI, NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM].
27. See, e.g., Testimony of Dwight E. Adams, supra note 16; see also FBI, NATIONAL
DNA INDEX SYSTEM, supra note 26.
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B. The Federal DNA Act28
The Federal DNA Act authorizes funds for the collection of DNA
from federal,29 armed forces, 3 0 and District of Columbia3l offenders
who have been convicted of certain offenses. These offenses include
violent crimes such as homicide, sexual offenses, kidnapping, robbery,
conspiracies to commit those offenses, and certain crimes related to
terrorism.32 DNA (typically blood) is extracted by Bureau of Prison
officials from individuals in custody,33 and by the Probation Office
from individuals on probation, parole, or supervised release.34 Any
individual who fails to cooperate may be forcibly restrained in order to
extract the DNA sample, 35 and may be charged with a misdemeanor
for failure to cooperate in providing the sample. 3 6 For individuals on
probation, parole, or supervised release, a DNA sample must be pro-
vided as a condition of release.37
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
A. The Search Requirement
The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if taking DNA consti-
tutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. All courts interpret-
ing the constitutionality of State DNA Statutes recognize the well-
settled principle that involuntary taking of blood from a person consti-
tutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Over thirty years ago,
the United States Supreme Court held that the government's com-
pelled intrusion into a person's body for the purpose of drawing blood
to determine alcohol content is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment,38 as are other processes that reveal private physiological and
medical facts, even in the absence of the physical intrusion caused by
28. The Federal DNA Act is similar in many respects to the State DNA Statutes,
which exist in all fifty states. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra, note 13.
Although only the Federal DNA Act is reviewed here, the constitutional
arguments, analysis, and conclusions presented in this article apply equally to
State DNA Statutes and state DNA law enforcement database programs
throughout the nation.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a (2002).
30. 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135b.
32. Id. § 14,135a(d). The Federal DNA Act was amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272
(USA PATRIOT Act), which added kidnapping and certain other qualifying of-
fenses related to terrorism concerns.
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a(1).
34. Id. § 14,135a(2).
35. Id. § 14,135a(4)(A).
36. Id. § 14,135a(5)(A).
37. Id. § 14,135c.
38. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
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a needle.39 For example, taking urine samples for a drug test, al-
though it does not require bodily intrusion, is a search under the
Fourth Amendment, because it involves government intrusion into a
personal, private activity, well-recognized by society as a function
meant to be performed privately. 40 Under this analysis, the use of
buccal swabs to collect skin cells from the lining of the cheek-a pro-
cedure allowed under various state DNA testing statutes-is a search
as well.4 1 The drawing of blood has been characterized as "minimally
intrusive;"42 nevertheless, the Supreme Court has said that physical
intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin to draw blood, infringes upon
an expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment.
43
DNA Statutes typically authorize DNA samples to be involuntarily
taken from persons convicted of qualifying offenses. The involuntary
process entails both a seizure of the person, and a search by intrusion
under that person's skin. Both acts implicate the Fourth Amendment,
and ordinarily require some level of individualized suspicion of wrong-
doing. Yet, when the government extracts DNA for CODIS, it does so
absent any level of individual suspicion, and for purposes unconnected
to any specific crime. If the acts authorized by the DNA Statutes are
constitutionally permissible, then they must fall within one of the
Court's few exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement.
44
39. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
40. Id. (analyzing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987), affd in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
41. See Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (assuming
that non-consensual cheek-swabbing to obtain DNA material is a search under
the Fourth Amendment).
42. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-26; Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 ("[I]t is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.").
44. Technology may advance to the point where virtually no intrusion is involved in
collecting DNA. For example, if DNA could be extracted from fingerprints, or
scrapings from the skin surface, such developments could change the Fourth
Amendment analysis. Currently, however, many forensic laboratories have a
preference for blood samples over even the less intrusive buccal (cheek) swabs,
because the swabs often produce less reliable results, due to lack of sufficient
cheek material in samples taken by insufficiently trained personnel. See NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DNA ANALYsIs BACKLOGS: TRANSCRIPTS
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE ON DNA LABORATORY BACKLOGS
(AGID-LAB) WORKING GROUP (March 4, 2002) (statement of Tim Schellberg), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dnainitiative/aO4.html (last visited July 1, 2004). In
any event, the involuntary aspect of taking the DNA would still constitute a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which protects both unreasonable
searches and seizures. Seizures are of no less constitutional moment than are
searches.
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B. The Reasonableness Requirement: Suspicionless
Searches
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "45 The
Fourth Amendment guarantees that the privacy, dignity, and security
of persons will not be disturbed arbitrarily by the government. 46
Fourth Amendment proscriptions are satisfied, therefore, only when a
search is reasonable. 4 7 Under traditional Fourth Amendment analy-
sis, a search is presumed reasonable when it is conducted with a war-
rant issued by a neutral magistrate, upon probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed, and the person to be searched com-
mitted the crime. 48 Under certain circumstances, however, the rea-
sonableness requirement may be satisfied even when the search is
conducted without a warrant, or under a less stringent test, such as
that of "reasonable suspicion." This reduced level of suspicion is typi-
cally defined as facts which would lead a law enforcement officer to
reasonably conclude that crime is afoot.4 9 Although the Fourth
Amendment ordinarily requires some level of individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing, the Supreme Court has said that individualized suspi-
cion is not an "irreducible component" of reasonableness. 50
In the few cases in which the Court has approved suspicionless
searches or seizures, the reasonableness requirement is satisfied if the
government's interest in conducting the search outweighs the intru-
sion upon personal privacy. This "Balancing Test" has been applied in
three ill-defined, and at times overlapping, categories of searches: (1)
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Camara v. Mun. Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979). Even when a search is
conducted under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,
such as hot pursuit, destruction of evidence, or other emergency circumstance,
courts have still required a showing of probable cause. See, e.g., Chambers v.
Marony, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
49. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968) (holding that a "pat down" search of a
suspect's outer clothing was reasonable, even absent probable cause, when the
officer reasonably believed the suspect may be armed).
50. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that nothing
in the Fourth Amendment expressly precludes a search and seizure based on less
than probable cause or other level of individualized suspicion); see also Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) ("[N]either a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspi-
cion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.");
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655 (recognizing that the balance of interests may sometimes
preclude insistence upon specific individualized suspicion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1966) ("[llndividualized suspicion is not a
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.").
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Administrative searches; (2) Checkpoint searches (border and high-
way safety programs, and (3) "Special Needs" searches. 5 1 Although
most courts agree that the DNA cases ought to be analyzed under the
"special needs" doctrine, the Supreme Court's reasoning in each of
these three categories applies substantially to the other categories as
well. Thus, this section examines each category in turn.
1. Administrative Searches
The administrative searches typically involve a government
agency or entity that either cannot function properly, or otherwise
achieve its administrative goals, unless it is allowed to conduct suspi-
cionless searches. The doctrine is typically traced to Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court of San Francisco,52 in which the Court considered
whether the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause would per-
mit municipal health and safety inspectors to inspect housing, absent
specific knowledge that a particular building had code violations. The
primary governmental interest at stake, the Court explained, was "to
prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are
hazardous to public health and safety."53 The Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement in the public health and safety context,
therefore, is satisfied when the government interest outweighs the in-
trusion upon personal privacy entailed by the search, and where pro-
tections exist to protect individual privacy interests. 54 Particularly
persuasive to the Court was that, (1) no other reasonable way existed
to achieve the administrative goal of protecting the public from dan-
gerous housing conditions, other than to conduct suspicionless area
inspections, and (2) the searches were not aimed at the discovery of
criminal evidence. 55  The Court used similar reasoning to allow
51. The suspicionless (or reduced suspicion) cases have been organized in various
ways by different commentators. The organization here is based on the Supreme
Court's apparent, but not distinct, grouping of cases in Edmond. See 531 U.S. 32,
37-39 (2000).
52. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
53. Id. at 535. The health and safety codes requiring the building inspections were
designed to address the public interest in preventing fires and other unsightly
conditions that lower property values. Id. In Camara, the Court essentially re-
cast the definition of probable cause in the health and safety context. Id. at 538
("Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would
justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different
from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation
has been undertaken.").
54. Id. at 536 (explaining that the normal requirement of probable cause could, in
this context, be satisfied if the code regulations were reasonable, such as where
enforcement was based on the type or age of the building, the condition of the
entire area, or the time since last inspection).
55. Id. at 537 (identifying three factors the Court found persuasive in upholding
these searches as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: (1) the "long history
ofjudicial and public acceptance" of building inspections; (2) that no other reason-
[Vol. 83:1
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firefighters (who are charged with finding the cause of fires as well as
extinguishing them), to remain in a building for a reasonable time af-
ter extinguishing a blaze to determine its cause.5 6 The Court also up-
held a New York statute setting forth rules of business conduct for
closely-regulated businesses (here, an automobile dismantling busi-
ness), and allowing the government to enforce those rules by con-
ducting warrantless inspections.57
2. Checkpoint/Roadblock Searches
The suspicionless searches conducted under this second category
differ in that they are performed by law enforcement. Because these
searches seem barely distinguishable from ordinary criminal investi-
gation, the Court has only rarely condoned suspicionless searches in
this context-and then only to protect our nation's borders or to pro-
mote the safety of its citizens upon the highways. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,5 8 the Court allowed the Border Patrol, operating
from a fixed checkpoint, to conduct suspicionless stops of motorists
coming northbound from the Mexican border. The purpose of the
stops was to stem the tide of illegal aliens flowing into the United
States from Mexico.5 9 The Court recognized that requiring a warrant
prior to stopping a vehicle would frustrate the very purpose of the
checkpoint, because the flow of traffic would be too heavy to allow the
officers to look inside individual vehicles in an effort to spot the
wrongdoers.6O The Court applied much the same reasoning in Michi-
gan Department of State Police v. Sitz,61 where it upheld brief stops of
motorists at fixed checkpoints to allow officers to question drivers
briefly, and check for signs of intoxication. The Court found the gov-
ernment's strong interest in protecting the public from the immediate
able way existed to achieve the public demand to prevent or abate dangerous
housing conditions; and (3) that the inspections involved relatively limited intru-
sion upon personal privacy, and were not personal in nature or aimed at the dis-
covery of criminal evidence).
56. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (explaining that although firefighters
could remain in the building a reasonable time to determine the cause, separate
entries made at later times to pursue their investigation were subject to warrant
procedures governing administrative searches).
57. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
58. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. ("A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reason-
able suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.").
61. 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
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hazard of drunk drivers upon the roadway outweighed the brief
seizure of the motorists. 62
3. "Special Needs" Searches
The "special needs" doctrine describes a similar exception to the
general rule that a search must be conducted pursuant to some level
of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. These searches are appro-
priate "only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable . *..."63 Like the adminis-
trative and checkpoint searches, these searches are distinguishable
from the typical law enforcement function of gathering evidence for
criminal prosecution.6 4 As in the administrative and checkpoint
search cases, reasonableness is determined by application of the bal-
ancing test, and protections must exist to prevent the dissemination of
results to third parties. 65
The term "special needs" was first used to signal an exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in the context of the
warrantless search of a student's purse by public school officials. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,66 the Court considered the reasonableness of the
62. Id. at 455. Similarly, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court, in dictum, suggested that,
given proper standards and restraints, "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops," 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), would be a lawful means of serv-
ing the state's interest in protecting persons on the highways by ensuring only
licensed drivers are operating vehicles, and that these vehicles are fit for safe
operation.
63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Blackmun, in his concern that the balancing test would too easily become a
substitute for the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, defined the special
needs exception in this way. Although first appearing in his concurring opinion,
this definition was thereafter consistently invoked in the Court's special needs
cases. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pattawatomie County
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
64. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 n.15 (2001); see also T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 341 n.7 (distinguishing searches "carried out by school authorities
acting alone and on their own authority" from those conducted "in conjunction
with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies").
65. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
66. 469 U.S. at 337, 340. Although the Supreme Court first used the "special needs"
term in T.L.O., this case did not represent the category of suspicionless searches
that later came to be associated with the special needs exception. In T.L.O., the
school officials searched the purse of the Respondent because she had been
caught smoking in the lavatory, in violation of school regulations. Id. at 345-46.
The subsequent search of the student's purse for cigarettes revealed marijuana.
Id. at 346. The issue was whether or not school officials should have obtained a
warrant prior to the search. Id. at 329. Because some level of individualized
suspicion was present here, the Court expressly declined to consider whether sus-
picionless school searches would be permissible. Id. at 342 n.8.
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search, balancing the student's legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government's need for effective methods to maintain order
within the school system, and to promote an environment conducive to
learning. The Court upheld the warrantless search, because, as it had
observed in its earlier administrative cases, requiring a warrant
would likely frustrate the government's purpose behind the search-
here, to maintain the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the public schools to preserve order and promote the educa-
tional experience. 67
Perhaps the most often cited "special needs" case is Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association.68 In Skinner, the Court recog-
nized the government's special need to investigate railway accidents,
and to protect the public from railroad employees who may be under
the influence of drugs or alcohol during their work hours. 69 The Court
upheld federal regulations requiring that railroad officials collect
blood, breath, and urine from employees involved in railway accidents
for drug and alcohol testing, absent individual suspicion of wrongdo-
ing.70 The Court explained that the purpose of the regulation requir-
ing the testing was not to assist in the criminal prosecution of
employees, but rather, to further the government's special need to in-
vestigate railroad accidents, and to prevent injuries that could result
if employees were impaired by drugs or alcohol. 7 1 Requiring a war-
rant under these circumstances, the Court reasoned, would jeopardize
the government's public safety interest.7 2 The "special needs" excep-
tion was further articulated in a companion case to Skinner in Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,73 which involved the
suspicionless collection of urine specimens from United States Cus-
toms Service employees to insure their fitness to interdict illegal
drugs and to use firearms. The special need of the government in this
context was to deter drug use among officers seeking promotion to cer-
67. Id. at 340 ("[TIhe burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the govern-
mental purpose behind the search.") (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of San Fran-
cisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
The special needs exception has also been invoked where, although probable
cause was not required, the search still required some level of individualized sus-
picion. For example, in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987), the Court
indicated that probable cause was not required for a public employer's work-re-
lated search of a public employee's files and desk, although ordinarily reasonable
grounds would be required to justify a search for evidence of work-related miscon-
duct. See also discussion infra subsection V.B.2. (discussing Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (something less than probable cause can be
constitutional in searches of probationers' homes)).
68. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 613.
71. Id. at 620-21.
72. Id. at 624.
73. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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tain sensitive positions and, again, not to prosecute employees for a
particular crime.7 4
Finally, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 75 the Court con-
sidered the suspicionless random drug testing of students choosing to
participate in school athletics programs in a public school plagued
with disciplinary problems stemming from the students' flagrant drug
use. Because drug use could expose student athletes to an increased
risk of injury, the school's express purpose in instituting the program
was to prevent the students from using drugs, to provide them with
drug assistance programs, and to protect their health and safety dur-
ing athletic endeavors. 76 Test results were neither turned over to law
enforcement authorities, nor used for purposes of internal school disci-
pline.77 Thus, the balance of interests weighed in favor of the school
policy.78
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S SPECIAL NEEDS PRIMARY
PURPOSE TEST
A. The DNA Statutes Prior to the Primary Purpose Test
Against this backdrop of exceptions to the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion, the lower courts faced challenges to the State DNA
Statutes. For the most part, these courts had little difficulty deciding
that taking a DNA sample involuntarily from any individual, even a
convicted offender, constituted a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. But many courts brushed aside the requirement of a special
need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, and instead, pro-
ceeded directly to the balancing test, finding, essentially in every case,
that the government interest in protecting the public from criminals
outweighed the minimal intrusion of extracting a DNA sample from a
convicted offender.79
74. Id. at 679.
75. 515 U.S. 646, 648-50 (1995).
76. Id. at 650. Protections were in place to protect student privacy while providing
the urine samples, and only certain school officials had access to the test results.
Id. at 650-51.
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id. at 664-65. Moreover, the Court noted that the most significant element in
this case was that the policy furthered the government's responsibility to act as
guardian and tutor, to protect the children in the public school setting. Id. at 665.
79. At least the reasoning, if not the holdings, of cases applying a straight balancing
test, is seriously in question subsequent to the Court's decisions in Edmond and
Ferguson. These cases include: Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998);
Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940
(10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn.
1995), affd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996); Sanders v. Coman,
864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493 (E.D.
Wash. 1993); Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County Junenile Action Numbers JV-
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Confounding the confusion were attempts by a few courts to find a
special need beyond law enforcement. One court upheld the DNA
Statute, yet candidly admitted that the traditional special needs rea-
soning could not be applied squarely to its DNA testing cases.8 0 An-
other court, construing the Pennsylvania DNA statute, held the
statute constitutional, finding the special need was to maintain an
identification system to facilitate the purpose of the statute, but ad-
mitting that the purpose of the statute was to be "a tool in criminal
investigations and for the deterrence of recidivist crime."81 A Wiscon-
sin court stated unequivocally that the DNA testing of prison inmates
was "ultimately for a law enforcement goal," yet it fit within the spe-
cial needs exception, because it was not undertaken for the investiga-
tion of a specific crime-just crime in general.8 2 Equally puzzling, the
Ninth Circuit, construing the Oregon DNA statute, upheld it based on
the reduced expectation of privacy of convicted offenders, "even if [the
statute's] only objective is law enforcement."8 3
B. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
The Court's more recent enlightenment on the special needs doc-
trine in Edmond and Ferguson, however, casts doubt on much, if not
all, of the reasoning of the prior DNA cases, placing some squarely in
conflict. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond84 provided new insight into
how the lower courts should determine when a government interest
was far enough beyond normal law enforcement to qualify for the spe-
cial needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment. The Court drew the line at seizures, even brief detentions, that
are authorized by government programs designed primarily to serve
the general public interest in crime control, even when the detention
involves no physical intrusion, and even when the program has secon-
dary purposes that may be constitutionally permitted.8 5
In Edmond, motorists brought a class action against the city,
mayor, and members of the police department alleging the city's drug
512600 & JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Calahan, 649
N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994); Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999); Cooper v. Gam-
mon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev.
2000); State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Orozco, 878
P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000); and Doles v. State, 994
P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999).
80. State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085 (Wash. 1993).
81. Dial, 733 A.2d at 3.
82. Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
83. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559-60.




interdiction roadblock checkpoint violated their Fourth Amendment
rights, because police lacked individualized suspicion of wrongdoing to
stop the vehicles at the checkpoint.8 6 At checkpoints located in areas
known for narcotics trafficking, and pursuant to department direc-
tives, police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, asked the
drivers to produce license and registration, looked for signs of impair-
ment, and peered into the vehicles from the outside.8 7 At the same
time, a drug-sniffing dog walked around the outside of each stopped
vehicle. The government parties conceded the primary purpose of the
checkpoint program was to interdict illegal narcotics in a city area
known for its narcotics trafficking.8 8
The Court distinguished this case from its prior suspicionless
search cases in the special needs, administrative, highway safety, and
border policing contexts, because in its previous cases, the primary
purpose of the programs was not to uncover evidence of ordinary crim-
inal wrongdoing.8 9 Thus, the city program violated the Fourth
Amendment, because its primary purpose was "indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control"90 and it was designed primarily
to "uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."9 1 Neither was
the court persuaded that the "severe and intractable nature" of the
drug problem justified the checkpoint program. Noting that the same
could be said of various other criminal activities, the Court stated it
was "particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule
of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily
pursue their general crime control ends."9 2
In an effort to save its case, the government argued that, like the
Court's previous cases, its checkpoint program also served to keep
highways safe by checking license and registration, and spotting im-
paired drivers. But the Court rejected that argument, pointing out
that if secondary purposes could invoke the special needs exception,
police would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose,
86. Id. at 36.
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 41. Moreover, the program was quite successful, netting about a 9% arrest
rate. In a four-month period, police stopped 1161 vehicles and arrested 104 mo-
torists, including forty-nine arrested for offenses unrelated to drugs. See id. at
34-35.
89. Id. at 41-42.
90. Id. at 45, 48.
91. Id. at 42. The principle that the primary purpose of a government program ap-
proving suspicionless searches must be distinguishable from the general interest
in crime control is not a new concept. In 1979, the Court in Delaware v. Prouse
explained that a hypothetical roadblock established to check vehicle license and
registration for highway safety purposes would be permissible, because it was
distinguishable from the government's general interest in controlling automobile
theft. 440 U.S. 648 n.18 (1979).
92. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
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provided they included sobriety or license checks. 93 The Edmond
court did not change the balancing test under which it had tradition-
ally approved suspicionless searches. 94 Rather, it established that, as
a threshold determination, the government purpose in conducting the
program must, at the programmatic level, be something other than
the discovery of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 95 Where the primary
purpose of the program is ordinary law enforcement, however, the
Fourth Amendment standard remains a warrant based on probable
cause, unless an imminent threat or other emergency triggers another
established exception. 96
The Court did not say that a government program was unconstitu-
tional if its primary purpose is in any way related to criminal law en-
forcement. After all, earlier cases condoning checking drivers for
signs of intoxication (Sitz) and spotting illegal aliens coming from the
border (Martinez-Fuerte) certainly involved law enforcement officers
doing what they were paid to do. Nevertheless, because the focus of
those programs was highway safety and protecting our nation's bor-
ders, respectively, as opposed to investigating crime and gathering
criminal evidence, these programs passed constitutional muster.
97
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id. at 47. The Court stated its holding does not alter the status of its previous
checkpoint programs that "still depend[] on a balancing of the competing inter-
ests at stake and the effectiveness of the program." Id. at 47.
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id. at 44 (stating that the Fourth Amendment would "almost certainly" permit a
roadblock to thwart an imminent terrorist attack, or to catch a dangerous crimi-
nal fleeing on a particular route).
In a later checkpoint case, however, the Court softened its imminent threat
position. In Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 888 (2004), the Supreme Court
allowed police to establish a checkpoint for the purpose of detaining motorists for
ten to fifteen seconds to inquire whether they had any information about a fatal
hit and run accident that had occurred in the area a week earlier. In holding
that the checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Justice Breyer ex-
plained that the primary purpose of the detention was to ask members of the
public for their help in investigating a crime that was committed by others, and
not to investigate the motorists themselves. Id. at 889. Thus, the court held the
brief intrusion constitutional, even absent reasonable suspicion that any individ-
ual motorist had committed a crime. Lidster seems to contradict the reasoning of
Edmond in that Lidster sets precedent for the detention of persons under the
special needs exception for what seemingly is a law enforcement purpose. The
reasoning of Lidster, however, would not likely extend to allow the seizure of per-
sons, whether arrestees or convicted offenders, for the purpose of extracting a
DNA sample to be run against CODIS. This is so because the primary purpose of
the DNA extraction would be to investigate whether any other crimes might have
been committed by that person, as well as to store the DNA for crime-solving
purposes in the event that person might commit a crime in the future. In addi-
tion, the forcible taking of a bodily fluid is certainly more intrusive than the ten-
to fifteen-second motorist detention presented in Lidster.
97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
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C. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,98 the Court shed additional light
on its primary purpose test, this time in the context of bodily fluids
extracted and examined by a state hospital, but ultimately for law en-
forcement purposes. Over concerns about the increase in cocaine use
of its maternity patients, a task force consisting of hospital staff, local
police, and other officials, devised a policy setting forth procedures for
maternity patients suspected of drug use to be identified, and their
urine tested for the presence of illegal drugs. 99 Patients with positive
drug screens could avoid criminal prosecution by entering a substance
abuse clinic.100 The policy contained detailed procedures concerning
the chain of custody and the particular offenses with which the women
could be charged, and allowed for interrogation regarding the source
of their drugs.lo'
Women patients who had been arrested in accordance with the pol-
icy brought suit against the city, hospital representatives, and law en-
forcement officials who helped create and enforce the policy, alleging
that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by these suspi-
cionless searches. 10 2 Although the District Court had recognized that
the police and the hospital were too closely intertwined in the searches
to render them constitutionally acceptable, the court, nonetheless,
ruled in favor of the state actors, because the jury found the women
had consented to the urine tests as part of their regular medical proce-
dures.10 3 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but did so because it found the
searches reasonable as a matter of law under the "special needs" ex-
ception.104 That court concluded that the state's interest in limiting
both pregnancy complications resulting from cocaine use and the med-
ical costs associated with those complications outweighed the minimal
intrusion upon patient privacy, because the screens had been con-
98. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Ferguson was argued before the Court only one day after
Edmond, but the Court did not decide the case until nearly four months later.
99. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-72.
100. Id. at 72. During the initial stages of the program, a positive test was reported
immediately to the police, and the patient was arrested. The policy was later
modified to allow for the substance abuse treatment option. Id. at 72 n.5.
101. Id. at 71-73.
102. Id. at 73.
103. See id. at 73-74. The jury instructions read: "There were no search warrants
issued by a magistrate or any other proper judicial officer to permit these urine
screens to be taken. There not being a warrant issued, they are unreasonable
and in violation of the constitution of the United States, unless the defendants
have shown by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiffs consented to those searches." Id. at 74 n.6
104. Id. at 74.
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ducted for independent medical purposes.10 5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the special needs issue.10 6
The Court distinguished its prior line of special needs cases10 7 by
emphasizing that in each of those cases, the absence of a warrant or
individualized suspicion was justified by a special need that was "di-
vorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement."os The
Court rejected the government's "ultimate purpose-namely, protect-
ing the health of both mother and child."109 Instead, it focused on "the
immediate objective" of the search, "which was to generate evidence
for law enforcement purposes"'1O1-a purpose that, the Court said, was
"ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime con-
trol."111 Given that the primary purpose of the hospital's program
was to ensure criminal prosecution for women who did not agree to a
treatment program, the case did not fit within the "closely guarded
category" of special needs. 112 The program was, "at its core, predi-
cated on the use of law enforcement," 1' 3 and the involvement of law
enforcement was essential to its success. 11 4 Thus, the hospital pro-
gram did not fit within the special needs exception, and it violated the
Fourth Amendment.1 1 5
V. THE SEARCH FOR A NON-LAW ENFORCEMENT
PRIMARY PURPOSE
Not unexpectedly, in the wake of Edmond and Ferguson, trial
courts across the country faced-and are now facing-new challenges
to state and federal DNA statutes, with most defendants claiming that
the involuntary and suspicionless extraction of their DNA for CODIS
is not constitutionally permissible under the threshold special needs
primary purpose test. Although lower courts recognize that the rea-
soning of earlier state and federal precedent upholding the DNA Stat-
utes has been undermined by Edmond /Ferguson, early indications
from the trial courts continue to signal confusion over the application
105. Id. at 75.
106. Id. at 76.
107. See supra subsection III.B.3 (discussing the Court's "special needs" cases).
108. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
109. Id. at 81.
110. Id. at 83 (emphasis omitted).
111. Id. at 81 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)).
112. Id. at 84.
113. Id. at 83 n.20.
114. Id. The Court stated, "[T]he immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes." Id. at 83. The Court explained its use of
italics, stating: "We italicize those words lest our reasoning be misunderstood....
In none of our previous special needs cases have we upheld the collection of evi-
dence for criminal law enforcement purposes." Id. at 83 n.20 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 86.
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of the primary purpose test to DNA data bank challenges. While most
lower courts agree that Edmond/Ferguson requires them first to deter-
mine the primary purpose of the CODIS program, they have remained
inconsistent in their holdings and reasoning. Two federal district
courts within the Ninth Circuit, in addressing the issue, have reached
opposite results, even though both courts rejected existing Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent. 11 6
In United States v. Reynard, 117 a district court upheld the Federal
DNA Act, finding that the primary purpose of the statute was to fill
the gap left by the fifty State DNA Statutes, and to permit federal
probation officers to fill the CODIS database with the DNA identifiers
of all qualifying federal offenders on supervised release. 118 Relying on
Ferguson's "immediate v. ultimate purpose" guideline, the court rea-
soned that adding these federal offenders to the CODIS database was
the immediate purpose of the statute, a purpose that was beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, and within the special needs excep-
tion.119 This was so, reasoned the court, even though a more complete
database would ultimately aid law enforcement agencies with their
basic function of solving crime. 12 0 Relying on the legislative history of
the Act, the court found a second purpose that went beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement-that DNA searches help to create a
more accurate criminal justice system, which would ultimately exon-
erate wrongly-charged or -convicted persons. 12 1
Rejecting the reasoning of its Southern District sister court in
Reynard, the court in United States v. Miles12 2 held that the Federal
DNA Act violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, because it
required him to supply a blood sample absent any individualized sus-
picion that his blood may provide evidence of any particular offense.
The Miles court stated that because the Act's express purpose was to
116. The Ninth Circuit in Rise v. Oregon upheld the state's DNA Statute, holding that,
in light of the reduced expectation of privacy of convicted felons, it was appropri-
ate to abandon the normal requirement of probable cause as well as the lesser
requirement of individualized suspicion, "even if [the statute's] only objective is
law enforcement." 59 F.3d 1556, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1995). The reasoning in Rise
most likely contravenes the requirement that the government program must
have a primary purpose beyond ordinary law enforcement. Rise construed the
State DNA Statute, and the more recent Ninth Circuit cases construe the Federal
DNA Act; nevertheless, the Reynard and Miles courts expressly rejected the rea-
soning in Rise.
117. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
118. Id. at 1167-68.
119. Id. The Reynard court looked at the DNA statute as 'programmatic" in scope, a
concept explained in Edmond, where the Court required that the government's
primary purpose must, at the programmatic level, be something other than the
discovery of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
120. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
121. Id.; see infra section V.A (discussing legislative history).
122. 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
[Vol. 83:1
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST
authorize DNA test results to be given to law enforcement officials
and to be used in criminal prosecutions, it fell outside the special
needs exception. 123 Further, the goals of ensuring accurate prosecu-
tion and creating a more complete DNA database were indistinguish-
able from general law enforcement objectives.124 Thus, said the court,
the Federal DNA Act is merely a general law enforcement tool, and
thereby fails to comport with Edmond and Ferguson.12 5
A. Discerning the Primary Purpose of the Federal DNA Act
According to its legislative history, the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 accomplishes two major purposes: (1) it au-
thorizes federal funds to states to reduce the backlog of thousands of
DNA samples from crime scenes and unprocessed samples belonging
to convicted offenders;126 and (2) it completes the national CODIS sys-
tem by authorizing collection of DNA from offenders convicted of
crimes under federal, armed forces, or District of Columbia law. 127 As
would be expected, the government's effort to use CODIS to control
crime is documented throughout the legislative history.128 But, given
123. Id. at 1138-39.
124. Id. at 1141.
125. Id. In a bold move, a Ninth Circuit three-judge split panel in United States v.
Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003), held that Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples, as set forth in Edmond and Ferguson, demanded individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing prior to extracting the DNA of parolees pursuant to the Federal
DNA Act. The court stated that "a search of the parolee's body to obtain DNA-
the compulsory extraction of blood for a law enforcement purpose-is reasonable
only if the search is supported by individualized reasonable suspicion." The court
reasoned that the primary purpose of the DNA Act is to obtain DNA samples that
may be used in criminal investigations, to solve crimes, and to prosecute the do-
nors-all law enforcement objectives. Id. at 1110. In January 2004, however, the
Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and agreed to hear the case en banc.
United States v. Kincade, 543 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). As of the date of publi-
cation of this Article, the case is pending rehearing en banc.
126. See infra subsection V.A.1 and note 133 (discussing the backlog problem).
127. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 8, provides:
Purpose and Summary: H.R. 4640 would authorize a new program of
Federal assistance to States to enable them to clear their backlogs of
DNA samples which have been collected from convicted offenders or
crime scenes and which the States have been unable to analyze, or to
reanalyze in light of recent developments in DNA identification technol-
ogy, because of shortfalls in resources and the failure of available labora-
tory capacity to keep pace with the growth of the DNA identification
system. H.R. 4640 would also fill a gap in the system by authorizing
collection, analysis, and indexing of DNA samples from persons con-
victed of Federal crimes, crimes under the laws of the District of Colum-
bia, or offenses under military law.
128. See, H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 10 ("[Due to backlogs], killers,
rapists, and other dangerous offenders who might be successfully identified
through DNA matching remain at large to engage in further crimes against the
public."); id. at 17 ("[Tlhe unique potential of the DNA identification system to
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CODIS's value as a crime-fighting law enforcement tool, it is little
wonder that most post-Edmond/Ferguson courts have struggled to
find a primary purpose for their state or federal DNA statutes that
will bring these suspicionless DNA searches under the protective um-
brella of the special needs exception. Among the justifications for the
DNA statutes, the few lower courts hearing these challenges since Ed-
mond/Ferguson have claimed a variety of primary purposes, declaring
each beyond normal law enforcement needs. Following is an analysis
of these various approaches, in light of the Supreme Court's explica-
tion of the special needs doctrine.
1. The Accurate Prosecution of Crime /Exoneration of the
Innocent
The language of the Federal DNA Act, which supports exoneration
of innocent persons, is an important part of the CODIS program. The
"Sense of Congress" provision, attached to the Bill and codified as part
of the Act, encourages states to recognize their obligation to provide
post-conviction DNA testing.12 9 Congress observed that DNA testing
has resulted in the exoneration of over seventy-five innocent men and
solve no-suspect cases through matching to convicted offender databases and
crime scene to crime scene matches is largely unutilized [due to the backlog].");
id. at 26 ("The CODIS program provides software that enables federal, state, and
local laboratories to store and compare DNA profiles electronically and thereby
link serial crimes to each other and identify suspects by matching DNA from
crime scenes to convicted offenders."); id. at 27 ("[Olne of the underlying concepts
behind CODIS is to create a database of convicted offender profiles and use it to
solve crimes for which there are no suspects."); id. at 29 ("[S]amples collected on
the basis of convictions for nonviolent offenses are actually among the most use-
ful in solving crimes, including violent crimes."); 146 CONG. REC. S11,646 (daily
ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("Collection of convicted offender
DNA is crucial to solving many of the crimes occurring in our communities."); id.
at S 11,647 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The inability to include these offenders in
the national index has seriously frustrated efforts to solve crimes and prevent
further crimes."); id. at S11,648 (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("Modern crime-fight-
ing technology like DNA testing and DNA databases make law enforcement
much more effective."); 146 CONG. REC. H12,032 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Gilman) ("[We must ensure that our Nation's law enforcement has
the equipment and support necessary to fight violent crime and protect our
communities.").
129. The Act, which appropriates funds for states to reduce their DNA backlogs, con-
tains notes following the statutory section that express the "Sense of Congress"
regarding the obligation of grantee states to ensure access to post-conviction
DNA testing:
(a) Findings. Congress finds that-
(6) DNA testing can and has resulted in the post-conviction exoneration
of more than 75 innocent men and women, including some under sen-
tence of death;
(7) in more than a dozen cases, post-conviction DNA testing that has
exonerated an innocent person has also enhanced public safety by pro-
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women, including some on death row, and that testing or re-testing
evidence has even, on occasion, led to the apprehension of the actual
guilty party.130 In addition, the legislative history of the Act supports
the importance of exoneration of the innocent. The House Report to
accompany H.R. 4640 (the Federal DNA Act) observed that
"[p]romptly identifying the actual perpetrator of a crime through DNA
matching exonerates any other persons who might wrongfully be sus-
pected, accused, or convicted of the crime."131
Despite Congress's indications regarding the importance of exoner-
ating innocent persons, however, the Federal DNA Act itself provides
no funds to the states for this purpose. Given that one express pur-
pose of the bill is to appropriate funds to make the system more effi-
cient, the failure to provide funds for post-conviction exoneration
makes it difficult to contend that exoneration of the innocent is the
statute's immediate or primary purpose. Thus, read in context, Con-
gress' concern over the wrongful prosecution of innocent persons
stems from the fact that hundreds of thousands of DNA samples are
backlogged, waiting analysis.13 2 The Act appropriates funds to assist
states in clearing these backlogs133 so that CODIS can be fully used
viding evidence that led to the apprehension of the actual
perpetrator....
42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135 (2002).
130. Id. See also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCI-
ENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AF-
TER TRIAL (1996).
131. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 10. See also United States v.
Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing the House Report as
evidence that exoneration of innocent persons is the statute's primary purpose).
132. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 10 ("As a result of these backlogs,
killers, rapists, and other dangerous offenders who might be successfully identi-
fied through DNA matching remain at large to engage in further crimes against
the public.... In addition to these obvious public safety costs, the current inade-
quacies of the system also endanger the innocent. Promptly identifying the ac-
tual perpetrator of a crime through DNA matching exonerates any other persons
who might wrongfully be suspected, accused, or convicted of the crime. Where
this cannot be done because of an inability to analyze and index convicted of-
fender or crime scene samples in a timely manner, the risks of convicting an inno-
cent person increase.").
133. On August 21, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft directed the National Insti-
tute of Justice ("NIJ") to assess the existing delays in processing crime scene
DNA evidence, and to develop recommendations to eliminate the backlog of sam-
ples piling up across the country. In its March 3, 2003 Special Report, the NIJ
acknowledges a significant backlog of casework samples caused by the insuffi-
cient capacity of existing forensic laboratories to handle the massive demand for
sample analysis, as well as the lack of trained scientists. See NAT'L INST. OF JUS-
TICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 199425, NIJ SPECIAL REPORT: REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DELAYS IN FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS (2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/199425.pdf. The NIJ reports that approxi-
mately 350,000 rape and homicide cases remain unprocessed across the country.
Id. Given that there are 17,000 law enforcement agencies, and 90% of these sam-
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for the purpose for which it was designed-solving crime. The reality
is that a convicted offender needs no coaxing to voluntarily submit his
DNA in order to be exonerated of a crime he did not commit, so it is
not logical that the Act's provisions, which force the involuntary sub-
mission of DNA, are necessary for the protection of these persons.
13 4
And, although an offender's DNA may later prove someone else is in-
nocent of a crime, it can do so only by proving that offender's guilt.
The first step in the accurate prosecution of crime is for law en-
forcement officials to arrest the proper suspect; and, in so doing, the
innocent may go free. For every guilty person going to prison, all
other innocent persons who might have been wrongly convicted for the
same crime are, by default, exonerated. Exoneration of the innocent,
then, seems indistinguishable from an ordinary law enforcement func-
tion of arresting the right person. What is more, the goal of accurate
prosecution of crime is achieved far more often through the govern-
ment's use of DNA to incriminate a suspect than it is to exonerate one.
In the post-conviction context, the government often vigorously fights
a prisoner's request for a DNA analysis to prove his innocence.
13 5
2. The Prevention of Recidivism Among Offenders
Undeniably, the government has a strong interest in preventing
recidivism among convicted offenders, who are more likely to violate
ples are in the control of those agencies, as opposed to forensic laboratories, the
scope of the backlog is difficult to estimate. See id. In addition, although all
states have statutes authorizing the collection of DNA from certain categories of
convicted offenders, substantial numbers of authorized samples have not yet
been collected due to insufficient funds and other problems. See id.; see also H.R.
REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 9 (referring to a December 1997 Depart-
ment of Justice Report, reporting a backlog of at least 287,000 unprocessed con-
victed offender DNA samples).
134. See United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting
the accurate prosecution of crime as a primary purpose of the Federal DNA Act).
135. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth., 570 S.E.2d 809 (Va. 2002). In
Globe Newspaper, several newspapers had petitioned for access to DNA evidence
after a man convicted of rape on circumstantial evidence had been executed. The
State of Virginia opposed testing of the DNA from the twenty-year-old rape case,
and the Virginia Supreme Court denied access to the newspapers on grounds that
the DNA sample was not a public record subject to disclosure. Id. at 813. See
also 146 CONG. REC. S11,647 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(proposing that Federal DNA Act grants to states be conditioned on their provid-
ing offenders access to post-conviction DNA testing, and stating: "States like Vir-
ginia continue to stonewall on requests for DNA testing. They continue to hide
behind time limits and procedural default rules to deny prisoners the right to
present DNA test results in court. They are still destroying the DNA evidence
that could set innocent people free."); Ralph Vigoda, Exonerated Rape Convict
Sues Detectives, D.A., PHILA. INQUIRER, Sep. 9, 2002, at B02 (reporting that a pris-
oner exonerated in February 2002 by DNA evidence filed a federal suit in August
2002, accusing the District Attorney's office of refusing for seven years to release
the DNA evidence that did ultimately exonerate him).
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the law than are ordinary citizens. Violent offenders in federal pris-
ons re-offend at a higher rate than felony offenders overall. Statistics
for the year 2000 reveal that 14% of those on probation for violent
offenses commit a new crime during their probationary period, com-
pared to 5.4% for all felons on probation; and 19.9% of violent offend-
ers on supervised release commit new crimes during their supervisory
period, compared to 12.7% for all felons on supervised release.136 Fur-
ther, 20.5% of violent felons on parole13 7 commit a new crime while on
parole, compared to 14.3% of all felons on parole.138 A report on the
recidivism of state inmates tracked for three years after their release
from prisons in fifteen states in 1994, representing two-thirds of all
inmates released that year, showed that released prisoners with the
highest re-arrest rates were robbers, at 70.2%; the percentage of re-
leased rapists who were arrested for another rape was, in contrast,
only 2.5%.139
The legislative history of the Federal DNA Act supports, to some
extent, the notion that a primary purpose of the DNA Act may be to
protect the community by discouraging recidivism among offenders on
probation, parole, or supervised release.140 Much of the recidivism
problem is attributed to the backlog of crime scene DNA samples wait-
ing to be analyzed, which contributes to the inability of law enforce-
ment officials to identify and apprehend offenders ,on release before
they commit another crime.141
The Supreme Court has readily recognized that those with prior
convictions are more likely than ordinary citizens, to violate the
136. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 194067, COMPENDIUM
OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 93, 95 (compiled Aug. 2002), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfs00.pdf [hereinafter 2002 STATISTICS COMPEN-
DIUM].
137. The federal parole system is being phased out. Pursuant to the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, parole was abolished and defendants are required to serve the
imposed sentence (less fifty-four days per year good-time for sentences greater
than one year, but not life imprisonment) followed by a term of supervised re-
lease. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984). These figures
reflect those who are on parole status under the old system.
138. 2002 STATISTICS COMPENDIUM, supra note 136, at 97.
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
("[Clongress desired to prevent violent felons from repeating their crimes in the
future."); see also 146 CONG. REC. S11,646 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of
Sen. DeWine) ("Statistics show that many of these violent felons will repeat their
crimes once they are back in society.").
141. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 10 ("As a result of these backlogs,
killers, rapists, and other dangerous offenders who might be successfully identi-
fied through DNA matching remain at large to engage in further crimes against
the public.").
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law. 14 2 But it has never condoned suspicionless searches of persons
based on their previous criminal convictions. 143 Typically, some level
of individualized suspicion is required.
To the extent that a convicted offender would choose the law-abid-
ing path out of fear that any new crime would be immediately de-
tected, CODIS may prevent recidivism, although no evidence
specifically supports this. Existing laws and penalties apparently pro-
vide insufficient incentive for would-be criminals to avoid incarcera-
tion, presumably because criminals don't expect to be caught. Just as
likely, such persons may learn to take greater care not to leave DNA
at the crime scene, or perhaps, to tamper with any DNA that is left
behind. 144
3. To Solve Future or Past Crimes-Not Pending Crimes
In a post-EdmondIFerguson case, a New York district court, con-
struing that state's DNA indexing statute, declared it beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, because the database's primary
purpose was to maintain information available to solve future
crimes.1 4 5 This court distinguished Edmond and Ferguson, observing
that both cases involved searches undertaken to obtain evidence that
the searched individual had committed a specific crime, 146 although a
DNA sample, itself, provides no evidence of an identifiable criminal
142. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (recognizing that "it is the very
assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of reha-
bilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law").
143. See id. (upholding state regulation requiring reasonable grounds to search a pro-
bationer's home for contraband); see also United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the search of a probationer's home must be based on
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001) (con-
doning search of probationer's home based on reasonable suspicion that proba-
tioner was involved in a crime, but expressly declining to discuss whether a
search based on less than reasonable suspicion would be constitutionally permis-
sible); infra subsection V.B.2 (discussing the reduced expectation of privacy of
probationers).
144. See Richard Willing, Criminals Try to Outwit DNA, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2000, at
Al.
145. Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 WL 256774, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2003) (N[I]t was apparently the expectation of the New York State legislature that
the data bank's primary utility would not be to investigate past crimes but to
maintain information available to solve future crimes."); see also Reynard, 220 F.
Supp. 2d at 1168 (finding that the need for a more complete DNA database in
order to solve future crimes not yet committed is a need beyond the normal need
for law enforcement).
146. Nicholas, 2003 WL 256774, at *13. In Edmond, the seizures were undertaken to
check for signs of narcotics in vehicles stopped at the drug checkpoint, 531 U.S.
32, 35 (2000), and in Ferguson, the searches were undertaken to obtain evidence
of cocaine possession by hospital patients receiving prenatal treatment, 532 U.S.
67, 70 (2001).
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act, and most likely never would be used at all.147 A DNA sample, the
court reasoned, merely provides a very small chance that it "may be
relevant to solving a crime that in all likelihood has not even been
committed at the time of the search."148 Another court found that the
DNA collection statute fit within the special needs exception, because
the statute created a database for solving not only future crimes, but
"crimes that have occurred but are not specifically being looked at
when taking any one individual's blood sample."149 Thus, this court
reasoned, the investigation is beyond ordinary law enforcement needs,
because the primary purpose is not investigating "some specific
wrongdoing."150
In the above scenarios, a database "hit" would lead law enforce-
ment officials to obtain another DNA sample from the individual for
confirmation, and it is this second sample that may be used as evi-
dence of a "specific crime." Nonetheless, under traditional Fourth
Amendment principles, the second sample is arguably "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree," unless the original search was justified at its incep-
tion.151 The Supreme Court has never set aside the individualized
suspicion requirement to sanction a search or seizure justified only by
the possibility that the intrusion might reveal that a particular person
has committed some crime, or because law enforcement officials were
not thinking of anything specific at the time.15 2 Were it not for
Fourth Amendment prohibitions against suspicionless law enforce-
ment searches for crime-solving purposes, many future crimes could,
no doubt, be foiled before they happen or discovered more timely after
they happen.
True, unlike the Edmond searches that revealed narcotics or the
Ferguson searches that revealed cocaine possession, a DNA sample,
alone, is simply blood and nothing more. Yet, it seem disingenuous to
say that DNA is not evidence of an identifiable criminal act simply
147. Nicholas, 2003 WL 256774, at *13 ("[S]amples of blood for the DNA databank
prove nothing by themselves regarding whether the donor has committed a
crime.").
148. Id.
149. Miller v. United States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D. Kan.
2003).
150. Id. (quoting Nicholas, 2003 WL 256774 at *13).
151. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) ("Determining the reasonable-
ness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether
the ... action was justified at its inception' [and] second ... whether the search
as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.'") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1967)).
152. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) ("We cannot sanction
stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interroga-
tion and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some
crime.").
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because it must first be handed over to law enforcement for laboratory
analysis, then run against unsolved crimes in the DNA database.
Moreover, suspicionless crime control searches are no less objectiona-
ble simply because the odds are against turning up a match.
4. To Close Gaps Left by State DNA Statutes
The Federal DNA Act's legislative history supports the argument
that its immediate purpose was to close the gap in CODIS left by the
absence of samples from Federal offenders. 1 53 Citing this legislative
history, two courts, addressing a post-Edmond IFerguson DNA Act
challenge, found the Act's immediate purpose was to fill the CODIS
system with samples from qualifying federal offenders to bring CODIS
in line with the requirements of all fifty states.154 Those courts rea-
soned that this was a purpose beyond ordinary law enforcement,
which brought the Act's requirements within the special needs
exception.155
This argument seems weak in light of the Supreme Court's admo-
nition to examine a governmental program to determine whether it is
"driven by an impermissible [law enforcement] purpose"15 6 and to
"consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant
primary purpose." 15 7 The DNA Act's legislative history is replete with
examples of Congress's intention to promote the goal of general crime
control through a comprehensive national law enforcement DNA
database.15 8 This goal cannot be achieved on a national basis unless
it contains DNA from federal, military, and Washington, D.C. offend-
ers, as well as offenders in all fifty states. But, filling the gaps in the
CODIS system has no meaning outside of CODIS's law enforcement
purposes-it is merely an inseparable step toward achieving CODIS's
full crime control potential.
153. See H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 8 ("H.R. 4640 [the Federal
DNA Act] would also fill a gap in the system by authorizing collection, analysis,
and indexing of DNA samples from persons convicted of Federal crimes, crimes
under the laws of the District of Columbia, or offenses under military law.").
154. United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318 (D. Del. 2003); see also
United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1167 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
155. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 322; Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
156. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
157. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001); see also Edmond, 531 U.S.
at 46.
158. See supra note 128 (discussing legislative history of the Federal DNA Act); see
also H.R. REP. No. 106-900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 26 (stating that the database
was created to "solve crimes ... by matching DNA from crime scenes to convicted
offenders" and to provide a nationwide database for "law enforcement identifica-
tion purposes.").
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B. Attempts to Take DNA Act Analysis Outside of the
Special Needs Doctrine
1. The Non-Law Enforcement Probation Office
The Federal DNA Act designates the Probation Office as the entity
responsible for collecting a DNA sample from qualifying offenders on
probation, parole, or supervised release.15 9 One court contended that
the special needs exception can be applied to the DNA database cases,
because law enforcement officials are not executing the DNA searches;
instead, such searches are conducted by the Federal Probation Of-
fice. 160 The status of probation officers as members of the judicial
branch, this court reasons, is evidence of Congress's intent to remove
this area from the realm of ordinary federal law enforcement, which
falls under the auspices of the Executive Branch. 16 1 The Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin provides some support for this argument,
describing the duties of probation officers as not typical of police, 16 2
and focusing on the supervisory relationship between the probation
officer and the probationer.16 3
The Supreme Court has never limited the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable government searches and seizures
to those carried out by law enforcement officers. Neither has it lim-
ited Fourth Amendment protections to those government agents
whose work descriptions fall only under the Executive Branch.1
64
Which government agents are conducting the search is not pivotal;
rather, the inquiry must be whether or not the evidence obtained is to
be used for law enforcement purposes. 165 Even allowing that the Fed-
eral Probation Office may implement the federal DNA program with
159. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a(a)(2) (2002) ("The probation office responsible for the su-
pervision under Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised
release shall collect a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has been,
convicted of a qualifying Federal offense . . .
160. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
161. Id.
162. 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) ("[A] probation officer is not an impartial magistrate,
neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordi-
nary citizen.").
163. Id. at 878-79 (explaining that the probation officer and the probationer have an
"ongoing supervisory relationship-and one that is not, or at least not entirely,
adversarial.").
164. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1985) (noting that school
officials are not exempt from the Fourth Amendment's protections by virtue of
the special nature of their authority over the schoolchildren within their charge);
see also supra subsection III.B.1 (discussing the Court's administrative cases).
165. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("The traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in
our previous cases on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the
search is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.").
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respect to its supervisees,166 the statute specifically requires the Pro-
bation Office to turn over the DNA samples to the FBI for inclusion in
its database, where it will be used to investigate unsolved crimes. 16 7
2. A Reduced Expectation of Privacy
Proponents of the reduced privacy theory would contend that in
the special situation of the convicted offender, the primary purpose
test would not apply-that offenders have no Fourth Amendment pro-
tections against involuntary extraction of their DNA for CODIS. Con-
victed offenders do have a reduced expectation of privacy, which
varies depending on the stage in the correctional process. With re-
spect to inmates, prison administrators-not the courts-make the
decisions and judgments needed to facilitate the safe and efficient op-
eration of their institutions.1S For obvious reasons in the prison con-
text, achieving safe and secure institutions requires a vigorous
program of suspicionless searches of prison inmates, their belongings,
and their cells. Even so, a prisoner is not wholly without constitu-
tional rights,169 and prison regulations allowing prisoner searches
must be related to legitimate institutional concerns.1 70 Challenges to
prison regulations typically involve prison security or the health of the
prisoners and the guards. For example, the forced administration of
anti-psycotic drugs to a mentally-disordered inmate has been held
166. As a practical matter, in most cases probation officers would not actually collect
the samples themselves; rather, the offenders would be required to report to a
federally-operated laboratory, or private or state entity with whom the Office has
contracted. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135b(a)(4)(B) (2002); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
900, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 18.
167. The Act provides: "The Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the probation office
responsible ... shall furnish each DNA sample collected ... to the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each
such DNA sample and include the results in CODIS." 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a(b).
168. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)
169. See id. at 84 ("Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from
the protections of the Constitution."); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974) (stating that no "iron curtain" is drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country); see also Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir.
1994) (explaining that although rights are diminished according to institutional
needs, a prisoner is not wholly without constitutional protection when impris-
oned for a crime).
170. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In Turner, the Court held that prison regulations that
impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights must be "reasonably related to legit-
imate penological interests." Id. The "Turner Test" is the standard to determin-
ing a prisoner's constitutional claims. Id. In determining whether the
penological regulation is reasonable, a court must consider (1) whether there is a
valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate government
interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the inmate's right;
(3) the impact on guards, other inmates, and on prison resources if the prisoner's
right is accommodated; and (4) whether there are ready alternatives to the regu-
lation. Id. at 89-90.
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constitutional in light of institutional security concerns.' 7 1 Forced
blood tests of prisoners are allowed in light of the penological interest
in diagnosing a serious disease and preventing its transmission
among the prison population,' 7 2 as are mandatory HIV screening of
all prisoners in light of the legitimate penological objective of protect-
ing prisoner health and preventing the spread of the virus that causes
AIDS.173
The Federal DNA Act directs the Bureau of Prisons to collect DNA
from individuals convicted of qualifying federal offenses for inclusion
in the law enforcement DNA data banks. 174 However, neither the Act
itself nor the legislative history reflects any penological or institu-
tional objective involving prison safety or security, and the Bureau of
Prisons does not control the database. To the contrary, the statute
directs the Bureau of Prisons to turn the samples over to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for analysis and inclusion in the DNA
database. 175
For individuals on release, parole, or probation, the DNA Act re-
quires the probation office responsible for supervision to collect the
DNA sample and turn it over to the FBI for analysis and inclusion of
the results in CODIS.176 The Supreme Court has never upheld the
suspicionless search of convicted offenders released into the commu-
nity on probation or parole, although these individuals do not have the
same liberties as others. 177 Courts are free to impose conditions of
release that do not allow the offender many freedoms which are en-
joyed by law-abiding citizens.178 But, conditions of release must fur-
ther the "primary goals of probation-rehabilitation and protecting
society from future criminal violations."179 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,180
the Court upheld a Wisconsin regulation permitting a probation of-
ficer to search a probationer's home without a warrant, based on rea-
sonable grounds to believe contraband would be found. The Court
171. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
172. See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1989).
173. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Walker v.
Sumner, No. 92-15297, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26517, at *2 (9th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that the need to prevent spread of the virus that causes AIDS justified the
threatened use of taser gun to coerce prisoner's submission to mandatory blood
test).
174. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135a(a)(1) (2002).
175. Id. § 14,135a(b).
176. Id. § 14,135a(a)(2), (b).
177. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (stating that probationers do not
enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . condi-
tional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions.").
178. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
179. Id.
180. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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recognized that the State's operation of its probation system presented
a "special need" for the officers to supervise the probationers to assure
that they were, in fact, observing the conditions of probation.181 The
lower level of individualized suspicion reflects a probationer's reduced
expectation of privacy, but this exception to the warrant requirement
in Griffin did not arise out of a generalized concern for community
safety. More immediately, the regulation was tied to the institutional
concerns of the probation office, and reflected the need of the proba-
tion officer, as an employee of the Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services, to be the person who determined how close the
supervision of an individual probationer should be. 182
In United States v. Knights,183 a post-Edmond case, the Court
again upheld the search of a probationer's home by a detective who
had reasonable suspicion that Knights was involved in a crime.
Knights, as a condition of probation, had signed a "Fourth Waiver,"-
essentially, an agreement to waive Fourth Amendment rights and al-
low any probation or law enforcement officer to search his person,
property, home or vehicle, with or without individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.I84 In light of the fact that the sheriff conducting the
search had reasonable suspicion to do so, the court held that no more
than reasonable suspicion was required in this case.18 5 The Court ex-
pressly declined to decide, however, whether the search would have
been constitutionally permissible if conducted pursuant to the Fourth
Waiver, based on less than reasonable suspicion, or no suspicion at
all.18 6 And, since Knights was not a suspicionless search case, the
Court stated that "there is no basis for examining official purpose," 18 7
as required by its special needs and administrative search cases.
Knights has implications for challenges to the DNA database stat-
utes. The Federal DNA Act, and many state statutes, require provid-
ing a DNA sample for CODIS as a condition of probation or supervised
release.1 8 8 As long as some level of individualized suspicion is re-
quired before a search, the DNA Act is difficult to uphold, since the
181. Id. at 873-75.
182. Id. at 876.
183. 534 U.S. at 114-16.
184. See id. at 114.
185. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
186. See id. at 120 n.6 (emphasis added). The Knights Court also expressly did not
decide whether the probationer's acceptance of the search conditions expressed in
the Fourth Waiver constituted voluntary consent. Id. at 118.
187. Id. at 122. ("Because our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis
that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for examining
official purpose") (citing City of Indianopolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000)).
188. The Act provides: "If the collection of a DNA sample from an individual on proba-
tion, parole, or supervised release is authorized... the individual shall cooperate
in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of that probation, parole, or
supervised release." 42 U.S.C.A. § 14,135c (2002).
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DNA searches are suspicionless. If the Court should ever decide, how-
ever, that suspicionless searches are constitutionally permissible in
the probation, parole, or supervised release contexts as a condition of
release, DNA searches may be valid, so long as the probationer volun-
tarily accepts the condition. The voluntariness aspect is troublesome
in light of the Federal DNA Act, however, which authorizes DNA sam-
ples to be taken by force,1 8 9 if necessary, and carries a misdemeanor
penalty for failure to provide the sample voluntarily. 19 0
The Supreme Court in Knights explicitly left open the question of
whether probationer or parolee searches could be conducted on less-
than-reasonable suspicion. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue squarely in United States v. Crawford, 191 holding that the suspi-
cionless search of a parolee's home, made pursuant to a Fourth
Waiver, violated the parolee's Fourth Amendment rights. The court
reasoned that a parolee retains an expectation of privacy in his home,
and any search of the home must be based on reasonable suspicion,
even when the parolee has signed a Fourth Waiver accepting such
searches as a condition of parole. 19 2 In so holding, Judge Reinhardt,
writing for a split panel, looked to the Supreme Court's recent clarifi-
cations of the "special needs" exception in Edmond and Ferguson, not-
ing the Court's emphasis on not condoning suspicionless special needs
searches conducted for law enforcement purposes. 19 3 The court rea-
soned that what characterized the common practice of conducting pa-
rolee searches pursuant to Fourth Waivers, particularly searches of
the home, is that the searches were designed to obtain evidence that
would be turned over to the police for subsequent prosecution.1 94 For
189. Id. § 14,135a(a)(4)(A) ("The Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the probation
office responsible... may use or authorize the use of such means as are reasona-
bly necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an individual
who refuses to cooperate in the collection of the sample.").
190. Id. § 14,135a(a)(5) ("An individual from whom the collection of a DNA sample is
authorized under this subsection who fails to cooperate in the collection of that
sample shall be ... guilty of a class A misdemeanor . . ").
191. 323 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for reh'g en banc granted, 343 F.3d 961 (9th
Cir. 2003). The Crawford decision was short-lived-the opinion was vacated
pending rehearing en banc. Id. See infra note 196.
192. Id. at 707, 714. In Crawford, FBI agents conducted a search of the parolee's
home pursuant to a "Fourth waiver" parole condition, hoping to pressure the pa-
rolee to incriminate himself in a two-year-old bank robbery. Id. at 702-03. The
agent admitted they had no level of individualized suspicion, but that they
"hoped" he might find something to show Crawford was doing, or had done, some-
thing illegal. Id. at 703. After nearly an hour of fruitless searching and question-
ing of Crawford, agents pressured him to leave his home to go to the FBI offices,
where he was questioned again for an hour and a half, ultimately confessing to
being a participant in the bank robbery. Id. at 704.
193. Id. at 713.
194. Id. at 713-14.
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this reason, such suspicionless searches fell outside the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 195
If suspicionless searches of parolees are not constitutionally per-
missible, then requiring a DNA sample as a condition of parole (or
probation or supervised release) would violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. Even considering that the home may have a greater expecta-
tion of privacy than a minimally intrusive DNA extraction that
reveals only identifying information, under the Crawford court's anal-
ysis, some level of individualized suspicion would still be required for
parolee searches. 196
VI. A NEW CATEGORICAL EXCEPTION?
The Supreme Court's primary purpose test aside, CODIS is poten-
tially the best crime-fighting tool since the advent of fingerprints. The
literature is replete with examples of its identifications of murderers
and rapists, and CODIS is understandably popular with legislators
and law enforcement officials. Attorney General Ashcroft has publicly
praised CODIS's remarkable crime-solving ability,197 and President
Bush has proposed a total commitment of over $1 billion to improve
the use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system.1 98
195. In so holding, the Crawford court rejected an opportunity to create a new cate-
gory of Fourth Amendment searches based on the California Supreme Court
standard for parolee searches, which allowed such searches if not "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or harassing." Id. at 715 (citing People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445 (Cal.
1998)).
196. The Crawford panel's dissenting member, Judge Trott, recognized the effect that
the majority's holding may have on challenges to the CODIS system, stating that
the opinion "blows an ill wind for California. We may have just thrown open the
habeas gates to a flood of petitions, disabled electronic monitoring, crippled DNA
banks, and who knows what else." Crawford, 323 F.3d at 737 (Trott, J., dissent-
ing). Any potential flood of petitions was abruptly halted, however, on June 21,
2004, when the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, affirmed Crawford's convic-
tion, but did so on grounds not related to the legality of the parole search at his
home. United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004). The court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether Fourth Waivers were valid, or whether suspi-
cionless parole searches were unconstitutional. Id. at 1054. Instead, the
majority reasoned that, even assuming the parole search was illegal, the pa-
rolee's conviction was valid because his confession, given later at the police sta-
tion, did not have a "sufficiently close relationship" to the assumed illegal search
of defendant's home. Id. at 1059.
197. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DNA INITIATIVE: PREPARED REMARKS OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2003/031102dnaremarks.htm (last visited July 1, 2004) (advocating expanded
law enforcement DNA databanks, and introducing the President's DNA
Initiative).
198. See OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOL-
oGY (Mar. 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/justice/dnainitiative-pol-
icy.book.pdf (last visited July 1, 2004).
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Given its current constitutional infirmities, however, maintaining
CODIS would likely call for the Supreme Court to create a new cate-
gory of suspicionless searches. One criminal procedure expert, Profes-
sor David Kaye, has raised the possibility of a new Fourth
Amendment exception, a "DNA Database Exception." 19 9 Certainly,
the Supreme Court may, given the opportunity, create another excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant preference. As Professor
Kaye notes: "[T]he existing exceptions to the warrant requirement are
not ancient specimens of an extinct species frozen in amber. They are
living creations whose structures continue to evolve and whose num-
ber is not fixed."20 0 Nonetheless, the Court has not created a new ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment in decades, and would likely do so
now with great hesitation. The Supreme Court has never approved a
suspicionless search involving bodily intrusion for a law enforcement
purpose, and to do so here would be a substantial departure from
traditional Fourth Amendment principles. 20 '
199. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 498-504 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Constitutionality]. Pro-
fessor Kaye recognizes certain constitutional difficulties after Edmond and Fer-
guson, but argues that the Court could create a new exception for a DNA
database for convicted offenders, and even arrestees. Such a database could be
established with minimal physical intrusion, and with sufficient safeguards to
protect privacy. See also David H. Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA
Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001) (discussing the
issues relating to DNA testing and the Fourth Amendment, and proposing a new
theory in light of constitutional decisions).
Even more intriguing are the ideas of Professor Kaye, along with Professors
Smith and Imwinkelried, regarding establishing a comprehensive population-
wide DNA database. Such a comprehensive database, they say, would be more
fair because it would not consist primarily of minorities (who are disproportion-
ately represented in the criminal justice system), it would keep the DNA samples
themselves out of the hands of law enforcement, and would eliminate the need for
coercive DNA dragnets. The professors point out that such a database may even
be constitutional if it consists of the DNA currently taken from newborns for cer-
tain medical purposes. The primary purpose of the DNA would be medical; thus,
its use to law enforcement would be a constitutionally permissible secondary pur-
pose. David H. Kaye, Michael E. Smith, & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Is a DNA
Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2001).
200. Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 199, at 499.
201. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Court refused to adopt a "clear
indication" standard for the intrusive search of a person suspected of alimentary
canal smuggling at the border. 473 U.S. 531 (1985). The Court stated: "We do
not think that the Fourth Amendment's emphasis upon reasonableness is consis-
tent with the creation of a third verbal standard in addition to 'reasonable suspi-
cion' and 'probable cause.'" Id. at 541. See also Crawford, 323 F.3d at 715





In final analysis, attempts to constitutionally justify CODIS fail.
The goals of accurate prosecution of crime and solving future crimes
are so entangled with ordinary law enforcement as to be indistin-
guishable from it. Moreover, the criminal justice goal of preventing
recidivism is, at best, a broad social purpose, 202 a secondary effect in-
sufficient to justify CODIS under the "special needs" doctrine.
Our national enthusiasm for the use of DNA in the criminal justice
system often overlooks the potential for inaccuracy in test results.
DNA results are only as dependable as the quality of laboratory facili-
ties and the qualifications, expertise, and careful attention to detail of
the scientists and technicians responsible for processing the samples
and assigning their biometric numbers. Crime labs across the country
have experienced problems resulting in loss of accreditation, forced
laboratory closing, grand jury inquiry of those responsible for labora-
tory procedures, and the possible conviction of innocent persons. 2 03
Nevertheless, our national enthusiasm persists.
That CODIS has proven itself remarkably effective in solving
crime cannot, alone, justify its existence. 204 Disposing of many
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment protections would, undoubtedly,
be a far more effective way to prosecute criminals. But, the Supreme
Court has never held that the effectiveness of a program justifies the
202. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 (2001) ("[L]aw enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose.... ."); City of Indianapo-
lis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) ("The detection and punishment of almost
any criminal offense serves broadly the safety of the community .... ).
203. See Roma Khanna, DA Rosenthal to Support Sutton Pardon, Hous. CHRON., June
27, 2003, at Al (inmate who served four years of a twenty-five-year sentence was
released from prison after tests found that the Houston Police Department crime
lab incorrectly analyzed DNA evidence used to convict him); Janette Rodgers,
Retesting Ordered for DNA Evidence, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2003, at A15 (DNA
testing at a Houston crime lab suspended after independent audit revealed lab
did not meet FBI standards for DNA analysis due to deficiencies in training of
personnel and in handling, interpretation, and documentation of DNA results);
John Solomon, New Allegations Target Two FBI Crime-Lab Scientists, SEATTLE
TIMES, April 16, 2003 (writing that an FBI lab technician was under investigation
for her alleged failure to complete all steps to assure accurate results in 103 crim-
inal cases); Timothy W. Maier, Inside the DNA Labs, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, June
2003, at 18 (reporting the following: Florida technician admitted to falsifying
DNA data in quality assurance tests; Arizona technicians erred in DNA analysis
in nine criminal cases; West Virginia forensic expert testified regarding DNA test
results in dozens of rape cases he never conducted; lab scientist proved by FBI
tests to have misidentified DNA samples in the past now alleged to have made
serious errors in dozens of cases in the states of Montana and Washington).
204. CODIS is unquestionably efficient at criminal investigation. As of March 2004,
CODIS has produced over 11,800 hits assisting in more than 16,100 investiga-
tions nationwide. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MEASURING SUCCESS, at http://www.fbi.gov/hqilab/codis/success.htm (last visited
July 1, 2004).
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program itself.205 Neither can the program be justified because it ad-
dresses a grave threat to society, or may prevent social harms. 20 6 It is
not that the government should not create programs which have the
ultimate goal of fighting crime-indeed, it should create such pro-
grams. But, the immediate purpose of those programs must address
the social problem in a way that ordinary law enforcement cannot. 20 7
Moreover, the millions of persons cramming our state and federal
prisons are proof that criminal investigation was hardly stymied prior
to the advent of CODIS. Overwhelmingly, most convictions result
from traditional police methods of cultivating sources of information,
interviewing witnesses, collecting physical evidence, and conducting
line-ups and photo displays. Police are assisted in their crime-solving
pursuits by a myriad of scientific and technological devices, and by
laws allowing law enforcement officials to compel blood, hair, saliva,
and other personal and bodily evidence when justified by some requi-
site level of individualized suspicion.
The express language and legislative history of the Act overwhelm-
ingly support crime-solving as its primary purpose. The immediate
goals of the Act are to identify criminal suspects, match their DNA to
crime scene evidence, and prosecute them-all ordinary law enforce-
205. Although the effectiveness of a program is an essential consideration in the bal-
ancing test, that inquiry is never reached unless a court determines, as a thresh-
old matter, that the primary purpose of the government program is something
other than a great way to solve crime. Where the government program is justi-
fied at the programmatic level, the constitutionality of the program "still depends
on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the
program." See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
206. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 n.22 (explaining that searches for the purpose of
generating evidence cannot be "justified by reference to the broad social benefits
that those laws might bring about (or, put another way, the social harms that
they might prevent.)"); see also id. at 83 n.20 ("[Tihe extensive entanglement of
law enforcement cannot be justified by reference to legitimate needs.").
207. For example, in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972), the Court
observed that the ultimate purposes of the Gun Control Act was "to prevent vio-
lent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their
borders"-certainly police functions. But, the Gun Control Act's immediate pur-
poses were narrower: to ensure that "weapons [were] distributed through regular
channels and in a traceable manner and [make] possible the prevention of sales
to undesirable customers and the detection of the origin of particular firearms"-
goals that could not be achieved by ordinary law enforcement procedures. See id.
at 315-16. Similarly, in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712-13 (1987), a New
York statute authorizing warrantless inspections of automobile junkyards, had
the ultimate purpose of addressing the major social problem of automobile theft
and dealing in stolen vehicles and parts, typically subjects of police investiga-
tions. But, in contrast with penal laws designed to punish individuals for specific
acts of behavior, the state statute addressed the problem in a different way-by
an administrative scheme that established rules of operation and business con-
duct for the closely-regulated vehicle-dismantling industry, and then allowed
government officials to ensure that those rules were followed. See id. at 712-14.
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ment functions. CODIS was designed by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, for the use of local, state, and federal law enforcement
officials. Disclosure of CODIS information regarding stored DNA and
sample analysis is limited by statute to "criminal justice agencies for
law enforcement identification purposes."20 8 The government has es-
tablished a comprehensive crime control mechanism that can exist
only if stocked with information obtained through unjustified suspi-
cionless searches. The only logical conclusion is that the national law
enforcement DNA database is unconstitutional.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 14,132(b)(3)(A) (2000) provides that disclosure of CODIS information
must be limited "to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification
purposes." CODIS information may also be disclosed in judicial proceedings to a
defendant for criminal defense purposes and for research purposes for a popula-
tion statistics database when the identifiers are removed. Id. § 14,132(b)(3)
(B)-(D).
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